Är medvetandet en emergent?

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nytt namn
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Är medvetandet en emergent?

Inläggav nytt namn » 25 okt 2009 04:39

En väldigt intressant tråd (för mig i vanliga fall sätter medvetandet för materia):
http://groups.gaia.com/ips/conversations/view/491111
Den handlar om att medvetandet är en emergent (och därför inte fundamental).


Här är t.ex. ett utdrag om kvantfysik och Bohr:
Darrell, your saying “energy is more real than matter” is a loose way of skirting the very questions I'm asking here, and IMO self-contradicts.  You could say quarks are more real than mass, but where does that get you regarding the reality of mass?  Is mass really any less real than quarks?  Can the reality of anything be seen as less real than the reality of anything else?

To go a little further into this question of levels, allow me to bring in a little quantum physics.  The main school in quantum physics, as it has been for quite some time, is the Copenhagen school shepherded by Niels Bohr.  Bohr was a gifted intuitive who saw deeply into problems quantum physics posed, and his responses to those problems remain a leading viewpoint to today.  A cornerstone of Bohr's understanding concerns the question of levels.  Bohr early realized how we talk about physics—or about anything—is via a level appropriate thing called language, a thing fashioned from and adapted to this so-called classical level in which our normal awareness operates.  In this level can be identified what typically are called objects whose outlines are relatively clear and which bear certain fundamental features like position and momentum.  Of course, the theory of the relation between objects in their various sequential positions and momenta is called causality, and is the basic fundament of Newtonian theory.  This “realm” of “objects” in causal movement is what Bohr calls the classical realm, or level.

The quantum level exists below the classical, and in the quantum level Newtonian notions of 'object,' 'momentum,' 'position' and 'cause' simply don't make sense.  One can see this by simply thinking hard on one or more basic quantum-level experiments.  For instance in the two-slit experiment, a photon's (or electron's) resulting position on a screen is seen to have resulted in part by calculations applicable as if that particle were a wave.  Particle, for its part, connotes location; wave connotes non-location.  Thus at the quantum level location is in part determined by non-locational calculations, a clear contradiction.

This type of thinking makes no sense on the classical level where location is location: a bus is there-1 and not there-2, an intuition that can be tested by simply stepping into the street should one doubt the level-specific reality of the sense of there.  On the quantum level, the notion of location gains sensibility only when undergirded by a non-locational calculation, that is, only when supported by a form of understanding that is incommensurable with it, that contradicts it.

Regarding the disjunct between our classical-adapted language and the new descriptive language quantum physics requires, Bohr says:

The universal quantum of action … has taught us that the whole mode of description of classical physics, including the theory of relativity, retains its adequacy only as long as all quantities of action entering into the description are large compared to Planck's quantum.  When this is not the case, as in the region of atomic physics, there appear new uniformities which cannot be fitted into the frame of the ordinary causal description.  This circumstance, at first sight paradoxical, finds its elucidation in the recognition that in this region it is no longer possible sharply to distinguish between the autonomous behaviour of a physical object and its inevitable interaction with other bodies serving as measuring instruments, the direct consideration of which is excluded by the very nature of the concept of observation itself.

One can gain a feel for what Bohr is saying by considering the following.  A dominating factor in our notion of 'object' is that objects look as objects, that is, as having definable qualities of location and movement.  This 'view' of objects literally corresponds, in important ways, to the viewing mechanism, is sight appropriate.  I can turn on a light in a dark room and suddenly there appear before my eyes what look to be objects.  These objects appear as such in part because their relative mass and complexity is so great they neither move nor become something entirely else—or entirely scatter before sight can operate—by being bombarded by light.

The same cannot be said at the quantum level, where the actions of light particles materially affect the phenomena attempting to be 'observed.'  One can understand from this that sight, and its object-seeming world, is level-specific.  Go down a level to that of the atomic and the notion of 'object' disappears given the much different interactions between light and matter at that level.  Go a further level down and the notion of seeing, already fuzzy at the quantum level, disappears entirely, as one will have then sunk below the level of light-wavelength or of light particle size (assuming that's a relevant form of measure).

Sight and with it the sight-enhanced sense of objecthood are therefore level-specific phenomena.  In proceeding analytically at the level of the quantum, what is required is a particular use of contradictory language, what Bohr calls the language of complementarity.  This language is only 'contradictory' at first blush, which is to say its contradictoriness works, in fact, is the only way to make language work in a level below which language was developed.  The fact that a contradictory use of language is the only way to language quantum realities—what Bohr below calls the process by which logical correlations are won at the atomic level—implies level-specificity.  Generalized applicability of a this-level use of language, including all its concepts, must therefore be renounced.  Thus Bohr:

In these fields (of quantum physics) the logical correlations can only be won by a far-reaching renunciation of the usual demands of visualization.


And as he then expands:

The renunciation of the ideal of causality in atomic physics which has been forced on us is founded logically only on our not being any longer in a position to speak of the autonomous behaviour of a physical object, due to the unavoidable interaction between the object and the measuring instruments which in principle cannot be taken into account, if these instruments according to their purpose shall allow the unambiguous use of the concepts necessary for the description of experience.  In the last resort, an artificial word like “complementarity” which does not belong to our daily concepts serves only briefly to remind us of the epistemological situation here encountered, which at least in physics is of an entirely novel character.


Enough romping around with Bohr and his semi-obtuse English expression.  My point in referencing him is to illustrate level-specificity.  Notions like 'object' and 'movement' and 'cause' and 'location' do not apply in the quantum world, but these notions are the only notions we have.  Apart from resorting to negation, we literally have no other.  I should also clarify that nobody has ever “seen” a quantum-level event or particle, whatever is down there.  All events we observe are observed in this macro, classical level in which “we” exist.  However, we do observe certain effects in this level that allow us to infer that below this level our this-level language of object and event does not apply “down there,” whatever any of that means.

Language, here, serves a direct analogy to what I was questioning above for consciousness.  Language is caught in a level-grown and level-relevant bubble.  A question I have, per previous posts above, is is consciousness in its own level-relevant bubble?

Ted above noted the close correspondence with language.  Though I do not similarly see consciousness arising from language, or at least what I'm calling consciousness—the self-reflexive awareness that, at least in my experience, can exist entirely without language—I do see a close correlation between language and awareness, or at least a typical form of awareness that includes thought.

But there does exist a category of experience that suggests consciousness is not relegated to what I have been calling the classical level for which language is particularly adapted and appropriate.  That category is the higher reach of so-called spiritual experience.  True to this category of experience, objecthood disappears.  It is quite conceivable, therefore, that consciousness has access to—can sense its way into—at least the quantum level, if not other levels (whatever, again, is meant by 'level').

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Inläggav nytt namn » 25 okt 2009 07:06

Ontology, Matter and Emergence
Michel Bitbol
Foreword
The  thesis  of  the  emergence  of  consciousness  out  of  complex
neurophysiological processes is commonplace (Freeman, 2001). Yet, it raises two major problems which are far from being correctly addressed. The first problem is a ìcategory problemî (by due reference to G. Ryleís notion of ìcategory mistakeî). Emergence concerns properties, to wit features that are intersubjectively accessible, and that can then be described in a third-person mode.  Saying  that  a  property  ìconsciousnessî  emerges  from  a  complex network of interacting neurophysiological properties therefore misses a crucial point: that consciousness is no ordinary ìpropertyî in this sense, but rather a situated,  perspectival,  first-person  mode  of  access.  Any  discourse  about consciousness  is  thus  bound  to  be  first  and  second-personal  in  disguise (behind  the  curtain  of  a  formally  referential  language).  This  problem  of ìradical situatednessî is discussed and developed in a recent paper of mine .
The second problem is an ontological problem, which concerns any case of emergence whatsoever, not only consciousness. If it is accepted that there are elementary properties (the properties of the putative basic constituants of the world), can there be genuine emergent properties? It is this second problem I wish to address in the present article, by way of a strategy of ontological deconstruction.

http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive ... gence1.pdf

...

Har nu kommit till sidan 11. Och jag har har svårt att hänga med, tror hur som helst att författaren har kommit fram till slutsatsen att "ontologisk emergens" inte "håller" och jag förstår det som att han menar att "emergens" i vanliga fall förutsätter att nya "egenskaper" uppstår i.o.m. "emergensen" men eftersom "egenskaper" inte finns på kvantnivån (borsett från "relationer" som är icke-linjära och därför inte går att tillskriva några egenskaper) så är "emergens" i sig självt är något som uppstår på en viss nivå (och därför inte är någon ontologisk grund).

Alltså: emergens (med dess egenskaper) är inte fundamental, för egenskaper finns inte på kvantnivå. Emergens bygger alltså på något mer "fundamentalt" (eller snarare "icke-fundamentalt"). Författaren menar alltså detta i en anti-reduktionistisk mening.

Usch, mina ord våldför sig på författaren, men det är ungefär så jag förstått det. Hittils. Hur som helst, jag skriver för att underlätta för dig att sätta din in i texten:

Här är författarens egna ord:
To see why this apparently disappointing dismissal of intrinsic emergence is pushing us toward a very positive conclusion after all, let me first repeat a most  gloomy  question:  since  one  can  lend  no  credit  to  the  idea  of ìontologicalî emergence, including in Quantum Mechanics which was our last hope, does this mean that the reductionists are right ? Does this mean that, at the end of the day, there are only the elementary constituents and their low-level  properties ?  Of  course  not !  Deconstructing  the  formal  concepts  of substance and of property in Quantum Mechanics is precisely as challenging for the reductionist as it is for the supporter of ìtrueî emergence of high level intrinsic properties. The physical process may have no substantial roof of emergent properties, it has no substantial ground of elementary properties either, according to the most straightforward reading of Quantum Mechanics.
Actually, this claim of groundlessness is presently creeping in many other branches  of  physics,  besides  ordinary  Quantum  Mechanics.  In  modern cosmology, it has recently given rise to the idea that the observable features of the ìelementaryî particles are just as much determined by global features of the  universe  than  the  other  way  around .


EDIT: från sidan 11 och frammåt blev texten mycket, mycket mer begriplig.

A  more  detailed  way  of  entering  this  new  trend  of  thought,  which combines emergentism with non-substantialism, consists in criticizing a very widespread distinction between ìbasicî and ìemergentî features instituted on the ground that emergent features are essentially relational whereas basic properties  are  monadic. T.W. Deacon , for instance, makes an  extensive, subtle,  and  interesting  (though  disputable),  use  of  this  alleged  difference. When he asks ìWhat emerges?î, his ì(...) answer is not some ëthingí but rather something like a form or pattern or functionî. The features that ìreallyî emerge are collective ìtopologiesî or ìconfigurationsî. They are essentially configurational, in so far as they express a definite web of relations between the basic elements. This enables one both to endow emerging features with some sort of autonomy at the purely topological or relational level, and to retain the ìfundamentalî status of the basic constituants of the world. The topological or relational autonomy manifests itself by the ability of high-level patterns or topological configurations to cause alterations of other patterns and topological  configurations.  But  besides  this,  the  basic  constituents  are (implicitly  or  explicitly)  ascribed  a  very  different  standing,  essentially immune from any action exerted by the above level. If one accepts, with T.W. Deacon, that what constitutes emergence is definitely not ìthe production of new kinds of substance or physical lawsî, but only patterns, this suggests by contrast that the basis for emergence is made of substances with intrinsic properties ruled by real physical laws.

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Re: Är medvetandet en emergent?

Inläggav freddemalte » 09 jul 2010 01:23

nytt namn skrev: Den handlar om att medvetandet är en emergent (och därför inte fundamental).


Vad menar du med "medvetandet"?

Fredrik


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