Ett utdrag av en buddhist som kritiserar olika västerländska tänkare, i deras försök att komma kvitt metafysik, (hoppar över endel, och landar här i slutat av hans kritik av den logiska positivismen, han kommer senare in på sin kritik av fenomenologi et al)
Källa: http://www.integralworld.net/capriles4.htmlCapriles skrev:the positivistic belief that metaphysics will be surpassed and truth will be attained by replacing philosophy with the positive sciences (etc.) could hardly be more erroneous. However, in the first half of the twentieth century, there were attempts to surpass metaphysics in ways that were very different from positivism’s—among which at this point it is imperative to discuss the ones made by Edmund Husserl and those who, after him, continued to develop phenomenology. Rather than reacting to Kant’s inconsistencies with a rejection of ontology, Husserl—who called his phenomenology an “absolute positivism” (one that was concerned with essences relevant for ontology rather than with observed facts relevant for science and technology)—and the rest of twentieth-century phenomenologists set out to produce an ontology based exclusively on that which appears[3] in experience, which, they believed, as such would be free from unfounded metaphysical theses. However, although for decades phenomenology enjoyed the highest prestige, nowadays it is widely acknowledged that it fell short of its purported aim.
One of the noted philosophers who made the greatest impact on denouncing this fact was Jacques Derrida (1967), who asserted phenomenology to be no more than a [crypto]-metaphysics, while branding the phenomenological emphasis on the supposed immediacy of experience as the “new transcendental illusion.” I endorse Derrida’s assertion, except for one detail, which I discuss in the note appended at the end of this sentence.[x] However, the reason why I view phenomenology as a cryptometaphysics and the belief in the immediacy of experience as an illusion springing from an error analogous to the one that according to Kant gave rise to the “transcendental illusion,” is particular to my own perspective. The problem, for me, is that basing ontology exclusively on that which appears[4] in human experience is no guarantee that metaphysical constructs will not slip into it, for in saṃsāra, to which human experience pertains, fully-fledged avidyā causes us to experience being as given, unquestionable, uneradicable, and somehow absolute; the mental subject as being in its own right and hence as a substance, and as the thinker of thought, the doer of action and the experiencer of experience; the essents we face as being in their own right and thus as constituting a series of different substances; etc. Hence an ontology elaborated on the basis of samsaric experience alone would not be really free from metaphysical fictions, as it is most likely to feature at least some of the ones just mentioned—given, inherent, somehow absolute being; a substantial cogito inherently separate from the physical world and even from the human individual’s experiences, thoughts and acts; countless external, physical substances—and probably many other ones.
The above is what in general occurred with twentieth-century phenomenology. The core phenomena of fully-fledged avidyā / léthe[5] that seem most outstanding as inadvertent metaphysical foundations in the system built by the trend’s originator, Edmund Husserl, and which he took for given, ineradicable substances, were the pseudo-absolute Cartesian cogito and the noetic-noematic (subject-object) schism that is the condition of possibility of the cogito and the axis of dualistic, allegedly immediate, yet actually mediated samsaric experience. Martin Heidegger found Husserl’s departure from metaphysics insufficient and set to carry it as far as he deemed it necessary, whereas Jean-Paul Sartre and others of those who received Heidegger’s influence set to go beyond Heidegger—yet both Heidegger and Sartre, like the bulk of twenty-century phenomenologists, failed to go beyond metaphysics, for both of them failed to realize that we are completely deluded and that the phenomenon of being that pervades our experience is no more than a deceptive appearance manifesting in our experience that constitutes a pivotal aspect of our delusion, and thus kept taking being to be given, somehow absolute, unquestionable and uneradicable (in fact, as I have shown in depth elsewhere [Capriles, 2007a Vol. I], Heidegger reduced Heraclitus’ concepts of léthe and alétheia,[6] and hence the dialectics between the respective conditions, to such as shallow level as to make them insignificant).
Heidegger, in particular, under the spell of delusion, overlooked the fact that the true nature of reality, since it cannot be included in a class wider than itself and does not exclude anything, has neither proximate gender nor specific difference,[7] and hence cannot be contained in any concept, including those of being, nonbeing, both and neither. And since being is the foundation of the whole of our delusive experience, which he mistakenly took to be given and undeluded, he made the logical mistake of equating it with the true nature of reality. Furthermore, although he rightly identified being with the phenomenon of being that pervades all of the experience that phenomenologists deemed immediate but that is actually mediated, he failed to realize the phenomenon in question to be one of the most basic aspects of the fundamental human delusion rather than being the true, unquestionable Base of the whole of reality.
On his part, Sartre seemed to have mistakenly, metaphysically assumed that there was a given, absolute being distinct from the phenomenon of being,[xi] and, like Husserl, to have assumed the subject-object duality in experience to be given and as such uneradicable. However, in spite of this, and of Derrida’s charges that in his interpretation and usage of Heidegger’s concepts he incurred in psychologism and anthropocentrism, the noted French existentialist had invaluable insights that can greatly contribute to the production of the philosophy required by our time. Among other things, he clearly showed the cogito not to be a substance (as I have shown elsewhere,[xii] by the same token providing us with the tools for elucidating the concept of svasaṃvittiḥ / svasaṃvedana / awareness [of] consciousness as elaborated by Dharmakīrti on the basis of the findings of Dignāga, and how it is related with the Dzogchen concept of rangrig[8] or svasaṃvedana); he asserted human existence to be drawn toward the holon[9]—his definition of which may be validly applied to Awakening (so that the meaning he gave the term is radically different from Koestler’s [1967; Koestler & Smythies, 1970])—as télos,[10] in such a way that all human actions, thoughts and so on were carried out in the hope of achieving the condition in question (which, however, he deemed it impossible to attain); and he dismounted the pseudo-unity of the Dasein into its constitutive elements, in a way that may be very profitable to Dzogchen practitioners. (For an in-depth discussion of all of this cf. Capriles, 2007a Vol. I.)