the problem with hierarchy
Before we discuss some of the finer points and conclusions of the evolutionary systems sciences, the first thing that we can't help noticing is that these sciences are shot through with the notion of hierarchy—a word that has fallen on very hard times. All sorts of theorists, from deep ecologists to social critics, from ecofeminists to postmodern poststructuralists, have found the notion of hierarchy not only undesirable but a bona fide cause of much social domination, oppression, and injustice.
And yet here are the actual system sciences talking openly and glowingly of hierarchy. I will present the evidence for this later, but we find it everywhere: from the founder of General System Theory, Ludwig von Bertalanffy ("Reality, in the modern conception, appears as a tremendous hierarchical order of organized entities") to Rupert Sheldrake and his "nested hierarchy of morphogenetic fields"; from the great systems linguist Roman Jakobson ("Hierarchy, then, is the fundamental structural principle of language") to Charles Birch and John Cobb's ecological model of reality based on "hierarchical value"; from Francisco Varela's groundbreaking work on autopoietic systems ("It seems to be a general reflection of the richness of natural systems ... to produce a hierarchy of levels") to the brain research of Roger Sperry and Sir John Eccles and Wilder Penfield ("a hierarchy of nonreducible emergents"), and even the social critical theory of Jurgen Habermas ("a hierarchy of communicative competence")—hierarchy seems to be everywhere.
Now, the opponents of hierarchy—their names are legion—basically maintain that all hierarchies involve a ranking or dominating judgment that oppresses other values and the individuals who hold them (hierarchies are a "hegemonic domination that marginalizes differential values"), and that a linking or nonranking model of reality is not only more accurate but, we might say, kinder and gentler and more just.
So they propose instead, in their various fashions, the notion of heterarchy. In a heterarchy, rule or governance is established by a pluralistic and egalitarian interplay of all parties; in a hierarchy, rule or governance is established by a set of priorities that establish those things that are more important and those that are less.
Nowhere in the literature of modern social theory is there more acrimony expressed than over the topic of hierarchy/heterarchy. On the one side we have the champions of egalitarian and "equalitarian" views (heterarchy), who see all creatures as equal nodes in the web of life, and who, with good reasons, inveigh against harsh social ranking and domination, arguing instead for a pluralistic wholeness that intrinsically values each strand in the web, with "higher" and "lower" being forms not of organization but domination and exploitation. Even the notions of "higher" and "lower" are said to be part of "old-paradigm" thinking, and not part of the "new-paradigm" or "network" or "web-of-life" thinking.
And yet, when it comes to the actual sciences of this web of life, the sciences of wholeness and connectedness, we find them speaking unmistakably of hierarchy as the basic organizing principle of wholeness. They maintain that you cannot have wholeness without hierarchy, because unless you organize the parts into a larger whole whose glue is a principle higher or deeper than the parts possess alone—unless you do that, then you have heaps, not wholes. You have strands, but never a web. Even if the whole is a mutual interaction of parts, the wholeness cannot be on the same level as the partness or it would itself be merely another part, not a whole capable of embracing and integrating each and every part. "Hierarchy" and "wholeness," in other words, are two names for the same thing, and if you destroy one, you completely destroy the other.
It is ironic, to say the least, that the social champions of the web of life deny hierarchy in any form while the sciences of the web of life insist upon it. And it is doubly ironic that the former often point to the latter for support (e.g., "The new physics supports the equalitarian web of life").
What's going on here? In part, I will try to show, this is a colossal semantic confusion—the two parties are actually much closer than either supposes. The real world does indeed contain some natural or normal hierarchies (as we'll see), and it definitely contains some pathological or dominator hierarchies. And just as important, it contains some normal heterarchies and some pathological heterarchies (I'll give some examples of all four in a moment). The semantic confusions surrounding these topics are an absolute nightmare, confusions that have bred an inordinate amount of ideological fury on both sides, and unless we attempt to clear up some of this confusion, the discussion simply cannot go forward. So let us try. . . .
holons
Hiero- means sacred or holy, and -arch means governance or rule. Introduced by the great sixth-century Christian mystic Saint Dionysius the Areopagite, the "Hierarchies" referred to nine celestial orders, with Seraphim and Cherubim at the top and archangels and angels at the bottom. Among other things, these celestial orders represented higher knowledge and virtue and illuminations that were made more accessible in contemplative awareness. These orders were ranked because each successive order was more inclusive and more encompassing and in that sense "higher." "Hierarchy" thus meant, in the final analysis, "sacred governance," or "governing one's life by spiritual powers."
In the course of Catholic Church history, however, these celestial orders of contemplative awareness were translated into political orders of power, with the Hierarchies supposedly being represented in the pope, then archbishops, then bishops (and then priests and deacons). As Martineau put it in 1851, "A scheme of a hierarchy which might easily become a despotism." And already we can start to see how a normal developmental sequence of increasing wholes might pathologically degenerate into a system of oppression and repression.
As used in modern psychology, evolutionary theory, and systems theory, a hierarchy is simply a ranking of orders of events according to their holistic capacity. In any developmental sequence, what is whole at one stage becomes a part of a larger whole at the next stage. A letter is part of a whole word, which is part of a whole sentence, which is part of a whole paragraph, and so on. As Howard Gardner explains it for biology, "Any change in an organism will affect all the parts; no aspect of a structure can be altered without affecting the entire structure; each whole contains parts and is itself part of a larger whole." Or Roman Jakobson for language: "The phoneme is a combination of distinctive features; it is composed of diverse primitive signaling units and can itself be incorporated into larger units such as syllables and words. It is simultaneously a whole composed of parts and is itself a part that is included in larger wholes."
Arthur Koestler coined the term holon to refer to that which, being a whole in one context, is simultaneously a part in another. With reference to the phrase "the bark of a dog," for example, the word bark is a whole with reference to its individual letters, but a part with reference to the phrase itself. And the whole (or the context) can determine the meaning and function of a part—the meaning of bark is different in the phrases "the bark of a dog" and "the bark of a tree." The whole, in other words, is more than the sum of its parts, and that whole can influence and determine, in many cases, the function of its parts (and that whole itself is, of course, simultaneously a part of some other whole; I will return to this in a moment).
Normal hierarchy, then, is simply an order of increasing holons, representing an increase in wholeness and integrative capacity—atoms to molecules to cells, for example. This is why hierarchy is indeed so central to systems theory, the theory of wholeness or holism ("wholism"). To be a part of a larger whole means that the whole supplies a principle (or some sort of glue) not found in the isolated parts alone, and this principle allows the parts to join, to link together, to have something in common, to be connected, in ways that they simply could not be on their own.
Hierarchy, then, converts heaps into wholes, disjointed fragments into networks of mutual interaction. When it is said that "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts," the "greater" means "hierarchy." It doesn't mean fascist domination; it means a higher (or deeper) commonality that joins isolated strands into an actual web, that joins molecules into a cell, or cells into an organism.
This is why "hierarchy" and "wholeness" are often uttered in the same sentence, as when Gardner says that "a biological organism is viewed as a totality whose parts are integrated into a hierarchical whole." Or why, as soon as Jakobson explains language as "simultaneously a whole composed of parts and itself a part included in a larger whole," he concludes, "Hierarchy, then, is the fundamental structural principle." This is also why normal hierarchies are often drawn as a series of concentric circles or spheres or "nests within nests." As Goudge explains:
The general scheme of levels is not to be envisaged as akin to a succession of geological strata or to a series of rungs in a ladder. Such images fail to do justice to the complex interrelations that exist in the real world. These interrelations are much more like the ones found in a nest of Chinese boxes or in a set of concentric spheres, for according to emergent evolutionists, a given level can contain other levels within it [i.e., holons].
Thus, the common charge that all hierarchies are "linear" completely misses the point. Stages of growth in any system can, of course, be written down in a "linear" order, just as we can write down: acorn, seedling, oak; but to accuse the oak of therefore being linear is silly. As we will see, the stages of growth are not haphazard or random, but occur in some sort of pattern, but to call this pattern "linear" does not at all imply that the processes themselves are a rigidly one-way street; they are interdependent and complexly interactive. So we can use the metaphors of "levels" or "ladders" or "strata" only if we exercise a little imagination in understanding the complexity that is actually involved.
And finally, hierarchy is asymmetrical (or a "higher"-archy) because the process does not occur in the reverse. Acorns grow into oaks, but not vice versa. There are first letters, then words, then sentences, then paragraphs, but not vice versa. Atoms join into molecules, but not vice versa. And that "not vice versa" constitutes an unavoidable hierarchy or ranking or asymmetrical order of increasing wholeness.
All developmental and evolutionary sequences that we are aware of proceed by hierarchization, or by orders of increasing holism—molecules to cells to organs to organ systems to organisms to societies of organisms, for example. In cognitive development, we find awareness expanding from simple images, which represent only one thing or event, to symbols and concepts which represent whole groups or classes of things and events, to rules which organize and integrate numerous classes and groups into entire networks. In moral development (male or female), we find a reasoning that moves from the isolated subject to a group or tribe of related subjects, to an entire network of groups beyond any isolated element. And so on.
(It is sometimes said that Carol Gilligan denied, not just the specific nature of the stages of Kohlberg's scheme, but his entire hierarchical approach. This is simply not true. Gilligan, in fact, accepts entirely Kohlberg's general three-stage or three-tiered hierarchical scheme, from preconventional to conventional to postconventional—"meta-ethical"— development; she simply denies that the logic of justice alone accounts for the sequence; men seem to emphasize rights and justice, she says, and that needs to be supplemented with the logic of care and responsibility with which females progress through the same hierarchy—points we will return to later.)
These hierarchical networks necessarily unfold in a sequential or stage-like fashion, as I earlier mentioned, because you first have to have molecules, then cells, then organs, then complex organisms—they don't all burst on the scene simultaneously. In other words, growth occurs in stages, and stages, of course, are ranked in both a logical and chronological order. The more holistic patterns appear later in development because they have to await the emergence of the parts that they will then integrate or unify, just as whole sentences emerge only after whole words.
And some hierarchies do involve a type of control network. As Roger Sperry points out, the lower levels (which means, less holistic levels) can influence the upper (or more holistic) levels, through what he calls "upward causation." But just as important, he reminds us, the higher levels can exert a powerful influence or control on the lower levels—so-called "downward causation." For example, when you decide to move your arm, all the atoms and molecules and cells in your arm move with it—an instance of downward causation.
Now, within a given level of any hierarchical pattern, the elements of that level operate by heterarchy. That is, no one element seems to be especially more important or more dominant, and each contributes more or less equally to the health of the whole level (so-called "bootstrapping"). But a higher-order whole, of which this lower-order whole is a part, can exert an overriding influence on each of its components. Again, when you decide to move your arm, your mind—a higher-order holistic organization—exerts influence over all the cells in your arm, which are lower-order wholes, but not vice versa: a cell in your arm cannot decide to move the whole arm—the tail does not wag the dog.
And so systems theorists tend to say: within each level, heterarchy; between each level, hierarchy.
In any developmental or growth sequence, as a more encompassing stage or holon emerges, it includes the capacities and patterns and functions of the previous stage (i.e., of the previous holons), and then adds its own unique (and more encompassing) capacities. In that sense, and that sense only, can the new and more encompassing holon be said to be "higher" or "deeper." ("Higher" and "deeper" both imply a vertical dimension of integration not found in a merely horizontal expansion, a point we will return to in a moment.) Organisms include cells, which include molecules, which include atoms (but not vice versa).
Thus, whatever the important value of the previous stage, the new stage has that enfolded in its own makeup, plus something extra (more integrative capacity, for example), and that "something extra" means "extra value" relative to the previous (and less encompassing) stage. This crucial definition of a "higher stage" was first introduced in the West by Aristotle and in the East by Shankara and Lieh-tzu; it has been central to developmental studies ever since.
A quick example: in cognitive and moral development, in both the boy and the girl, the stage of preoperational or preconventional thought is concerned largely with the individual's own point of view ("narcissistic"). The next stage, the operational or conventional stage, still takes account of the individual's own point of view, but adds the capacity to take the view of others into account. Nothing fundamental is lost; rather, something new is added. And so in this sense it is properly said that this stage is higher or deeper, meaning more valuable and useful for a wider range of interactions. Conventional thought is more valuable than preconventional thought in establishing a balanced moral response (and postconventional is even more valuable, and so on).
As Hegel first put it, and as developmentalists have echoed ever since, each stage is adequate and valuable, but each deeper or higher stage is more adequate and, in that sense only, more valuable (which always means more holistic, or capable of a wider response).
It is for all these reasons that Koestler, after noting that all hierarchies are composed of holons, or increasing orders of wholeness, pointed out that the correct word for "hierarchy" is actually holarchy.
He is absolutely correct, and so from now on I will use "hierarchy" and "holarchy" interchangeably.
Thus heterarchists, who claim that "heterarchy" and "holism" are the same thing (and that both are contrasted to the divisive and nasty "hierarchy"), have got it exactly backward: The only way to get a holism is via a holarchy. Heterarchy, in and by itself, is merely differentiation without integration, disjointed parts recognizing no common and deeper purpose or organization: heaps, not wholes.
pathology
That is normal or natural holarchy, the sequential or stagelike unfolding of larger networks of increasing wholeness, with the larger or wider wholes being able to exert influence over the lower-order wholes. And as natural, desirable, and unavoidable as that is, you can already start to see how holarchies can go pathological. If the higher levels can exert influence over the lower levels, they can also overdominate or even repress and alienate the lower levels. And that leads to a host of pathological difficulties, in both the individual and society at large.
It is precisely because the world is arranged holarchically, precisely because it contains fields within fields within fields, that things can go so profoundly wrong, that a disruption or pathology in one field can reverberate throughout an entire system. And the cure for this pathology, in all systems, is essentially the same: rooting out the pathological holons so that the holarchy itself can return to harmony. The cure does not consist in getting rid of holarchy per se, since, even if that were possible, it would simply result in a uniform, one-dimensional flatland of no value distinctions at all (which is why those critics who toss out hierarchy in general immediately replace it with a new scale of values of their own, i.e., with their own particular hierarchy).
Rather, the cure of any diseased system consists in rooting out any holons that have usurped their position in the overall system by abusing their power of upward or downward causation. This is exactly the cure we see at work in psychoanalysis (shadow holons refuse integration), critical social theory (ideological holons distort open communication), democratic revolutions (monarchical or fascist holons oppress the body politic), medical science interventions (cancerous holons invade a benign system), radical feminist critiques (patriarchal holons dominate the public sphere), and so on. It is not getting rid of holarchy per se, but arresting (and integrating) the arrogant holons.
In short, the existence of pathological hierarchies does not damn the existence of hierarchies in general. That distinction is crucial and, for the most part, very easy to spot. Thus Riane Eisler, herself a rather staunch champion of heterarchy, nonetheless emphatically notes that "an important distinction should be made between domination and actualization hierarchies. The term domination hierarchies describes hierarchies based on force or the express or implied threat of force. Such hierarchies are very different from the types of hierarchies found in progressions from lower to higher orderings of functioning—such as the progression from cells to organs in living organisms, for example. These types of hierarchies may be characterized by the term actualization hierarchies because their function is to maximize the organism's potentials. By contrast, human hierarchies based on force or the threat of force not only inhibit personal creativity but also result in social systems in which the lowest (basest) human qualities are reinforced and humanity's higher aspirations (traits such as compassion and empathy as well as the striving for truth and justice) are systematically suppressed."
Let us further note that, by Eisler's own definitions, what dominator hierarchies are suppressing is in fact the individual's own actualization hierarchies!—what she calls "humanity's higher aspirations" instead of its "lowest (basest) qualities." In other words, the cure for pathological hierarchy is actualization hierarchy, not heterarchy (which would produce more heaps and fragments, not wholes and cures).
These types of distinctions are crucial, because not only are there pathological or dominator hierarchies, there are pathological or dominator heterarchies (which is a topic that heterarchists studiously avoid). I just suggested that normal hierarchy, or the holism between levels, goes pathological when there is a breakdown between levels and a particular holon assumes a repressive, oppressive, arrogant role of dominance over other holons (whether in individual or social development). On the other hand, normal heterarchy, which is holism within any level, goes pathological when there is a blurring or fusion of that level with its environment: a particular holon doesn't stand out too much, it blends in too much; it doesn't arrogate itself above others, it loses itself in others—and all distinctions, of value or identity, are lost (the individual holon finds its value and identity only through others).
In other words, in pathological hierarchy, one holon assumes agentic dominance to the detriment of all. This holon doesn't assume it is both a whole and a part, it assumes it is the whole, period. On the other hand, in pathological heterarchy, individual holons lose their distinctive value and identity in a communal fusion and meltdown. This holon doesn't assume it is both a whole and a part, it assumes it is a part, period. It becomes only instrumental to some other use; it is merely a strand in the web; it has no intrinsic value.
Thus, pathological heterarchy means not union but fusion; not integration but indissociation; not relating but dissolving. All values become equalized and homogenized in a flatland devoid of individual values or identities; nothing can be said to be deeper or higher or better in any meaningful sense; all values vanish into a herd mentality of the bland leading the bland.
Whereas pathological hierarchy is a type of ontological fascism (with the one dominating the many), pathological heterarchy is a type of ontological totalitarianism (with the many dominating the one)—all of which we will discuss in detail in later chapters (where we will see that pathological hierarchy and pathological heterarchy are, respectively, types of pathological agency and pathological communion; and we will further see that these two pathologies are often associated, respectively, with the male and female value spheres—as with the work of Gilligan, Eisler, et al.—the males "ranking" and the females "linking," with the possible respective pathologies of dominance and fusion; feminists center on the male pathologies of dominance and miss the equally catastrophic pathologies of fusion).
In the meantime, beware any theorist who pushes solely hierarchy or solely heterarchy, or attempts to give greater value to one or the other in an ontological sense. When I use the term "holarchy," I will especially mean the balance of normal hierarchy and normal heterarchy (as the context will make clear). "Holarchy" undercuts both extreme hierarchy and extreme heterarchy, and allows the discussion to move forward with, I believe, the best of both worlds kept firmly in mind.
Finally, I would say that in trying to redress the severe imbalances of pathological hierarchy (which, as I indicated, we will explore under the category of pathological masculinity and pathological agency, sometimes called "the patriarchy"), we are allowed, even enjoined, to give normal femininity and normal heterarchy an exaggerated emphasis and a greater value, simply because we are trying to balance the scales. We are not allowed, I believe, to go to the other extreme and replace pathological masculinity with pathological femininity—or, to say virtually the same thing, we don't cure pathological hierarchy with pathological heterarchy.
qualitative distinctions
The fact that actualization hierarchies involve a ranking of increasing holistic capacity—or even a ranking of value—is deeply disturbing to believers in extreme heterarchy, who categorically reject any sort of actual ranking or judgments whatsoever. With very good and often noble reasons (many of which I heartily support), they point out that value ranking is a hierarchical judgment that all too often translates into social oppression and inequality, and that in today's world the more compassionate and just response is a radically egalitarian or pluralistic system—a heterarchy of equal values. And while some of these critics are, as I said, quite nobly inspired, some of them have become quite rancorous, even vicious, in their vocal condemnation of any sort of value hierarchies. "Higher" has become their all-purpose dirty word.
What they don't seem to realize is that their valued embrace of heterarchy is itself a hierarchical judgment. They value heterarchy; they feel it embodies more justice, and compassion, and decency; they contrast it with hierarchical views, which they feel are dominating and denigrating. In other words, they rank these two views, and they feel one is definitely better than the other. That is, they have their own hierarchy, their own value ranking.
But since they consciously deny hierarchy altogether, they must obscure and hide their own. They must pretend that their own hierarchy is not a hierarchy. Their ranking becomes unacknowledged, hidden, covert. Further, not only is their own hierarchy hidden, it is self-contradictory: it is a hierarchy that denies hierarchy. They are presupposing that which they deny; they are consciously disavowing what their actual stance assumes.
By refusing even to look at hierarchy, even while making massively hierarchical judgments anyway, they are saddled with a rather crude and very poorly-thought-out hierarchy of values. This all too often, and unfortunately, lends an unmistakable air of hypocrisy to their stance. With much righteous indignation, they hierarchically denounce hierarchy. With their left hand they are doing what their right despises in everybody else. By hating judgments, and by hiding their own, they convert self-loathing into righteous condemnation of others.
In essence, their stance amounts to: "I have my ranking, but you shall not have yours. And further, by pretending that my ranking is not a ranking"—that move is done unconsciously—"I will say that I am without ranking altogether; and I shall then, in the name of compassion and equality, despise and attack ranking wherever I find it, because ranking is very bad."
By making these hierarchical judgments in an unacknowledged fashion, they avoid and suppress the really difficult issues of just how we go about making our value judgments in the first place. They are articulate on the lamentable hierarchical value judgments of others, but strangely inarticulate—totally silent, actually—as to how and why they arrived at their own. Their self-ethic of inarticulacy and their other-ethic of vocal condemnation combine to form a large club with which they simply bash others in the name of kindness. And while this is wonderful to get the emotions running in a politically correct college-age mentality, it does precisely nothing to help articulate the nature of human value systems, the nature of how men and women go about choosing the good, and the true, and the beautiful, choices that involve ranking, and choices that these critics make and then deny they have made.
Their heterarchy is a stealth hierarchy. They bury their tracks, then claim they have no tracks, and thus avoid and repress the truly profound and difficult topic: why do human beings always leave tracks? Why is the finding of value in the world inherent in the human situation? And since, even if we decide to value everything equally, that involves rejecting value systems that do not, why is some sort of ranking unavoidable? Why are qualitative distinctions built into the fabric of the human orientation? Why is trying to deny value itself a value? Why is denying ranking itself a ranking? And given that, how can we sanely and consciously choose our unavoidable hierarchies, and not merely fall into the ethics of unacknowledgment and suppression and inarticulacy?
Charles Taylor, whose book Sources of the Self will be one of our constant companions later in this volume, has done a masterful job of tracing the modern rise of the worldview that claims it is not a worldview. That is, the rise of certain value judgments that deny they are value judgments, the rise of certain hierarchies that deny the existence of hierarchies. It is an altogether fascinating story, and one we will later follow in detail, but for the moment we might observe the following.
Taylor begins by noting that the making of what he calls "qualitative distinctions" is an unavoidable aspect of the human situation. We simply find ourselves existing in various contexts, in various frameworks (as I would put it, we are holons within holons, contexts within contexts), and these contexts unavoidably constitute various values and meanings that are embedded in our situation. "What I have been calling a framework," says Taylor, "incorporates a crucial set of qualitative distinctions [a value hierarchy]. To think, feel, judge within such a framework is to function with the sense that some action, or mode of life, or mode of feeling is incomparably higher than the others which are more readily available to us. I am using 'higher' here in a generic sense. The sense of what the difference consists in may take many forms. One form of life may be seen as fuller, another way of feeling and acting as purer, a mode of feeling or living as deeper, a style of life as more admirable, and so on."
Thus, even those who embrace heterarchy or radical pluralism are making deep and profound qualitative distinctions, even though they denounce qualitative distinctions as brutal and vicious, even though they deny the notion of frameworks altogether. "But this person doesn't lack a framework. On the contrary, he has a strong commitment to a certain ideal of benevolence. He admires people who live up to this ideal, condemns those who fail or who are too confused even to accept it, feels wrong when he himself falls below it. He lives within a moral horizon which cannot be explicated by his own moral theory."
The point is that, even though this individual espouses diversity and equality of values, the idea is never, as Taylor puts it, that "whatever we do is acceptable."
I want to defend the strong thesis that doing without frameworks is utterly impossible for us; otherwise put, that the horizons within which we live our lives and which make sense of them have to include these strong qualitative discriminations [value hierarchies]. Moreover, this is not meant just as a contingently true psychological fact about human beings, which could perhaps turn out one day not to hold for some exceptional individual or new type, some superman of disengaged objectification. Rather, the claim is that living within such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency . . . and not some optional extra we might just as well do without.
Yet there is a modern outlook, says Taylor, "which is tempted to deny these frameworks altogether. My thesis here is that this idea is deeply mistaken . . . and deeply confused. It reads the affirmation of life and freedom as involving a repudiation of qualitative distinctions, a rejection of constitutive goods as such, while these are themselves reflections of qualitative distinctions and presuppose some conception of qualitative goods."
In the course of historically tracing the curious rise of this curious stance, Taylor notes that "the more one examines the motives—what Nietzsche would call the 'genealogy'—of these theories, the stranger they appear. It seems that they are motivated by the strongest moral ideals, such as freedom, altruism, and universalism [i.e., universal pluralism]. These are among the central moral aspirations of modern culture, the hyper goods [strong hierarchies] which are distinctive to it. And yet what these ideals drive the theorists toward is a denial of all such goods. They are caught in a strange pragmatic contradiction, whereby the very goods which move them push them to deny or denature all such goods. They are constitutionally incapable of coming clean about the deeper sources of their own thinking. Their thought is inescapably cramped." They are morally superior in a universe where nothing is supposed to be superior.
The resultant "frameworkless agent," says Taylor, "is a monster," motivated by the "deep incoherence and self-illusion which this denial involves." This hierarchical denial of hierarchy involves an ethics of suppression, as Taylor says, because "layers of suppression" are required to so thoroughly conceal from oneself the sources of one's own judgments.
And this further explains why these theorists are, as Taylor puts it, "parasitic." Since they can't "come clean about the deeper sources of their own thinking," they necessarily live off nothing but the vocal denouncements of those views that do manage to consciously acknowledge their own qualitative distinctions. "Because their moral sources are unavowable, they are mainly invoked in polemic. Their principal words of power are denunciatory. Much of what they [actually] live by has to be inferred from the rage with which their enemies are attacked and refuted. This self-concealing kind of philosophy is also thereby parasitic. . . ." It lives to conquer, in the name of never conquering again.
Thus, even the radical pluralists (the heterarchists) are motivated by values of freedom, altruism (universal benevolence), and universal pluralism. These are deeply hierarchical judgments, and judgments that— rightly, I believe!—vigorously reject other types of value judgments and other types of hierarchies that have flourished throughout history. They deeply reject the warrior ethic, the ethic of elite aristocracy, the male-only ethic, and the master-slave ethic, to name a few.
In other words, their heterarchical values are held in place by hierarchical judgments (most of which I thoroughly agree with), and they might as well come clean and join the rest of us in trying to consciously understand all that, and not simply bury their tracks in parasitic and denunciatory and suppressive rhetoric.
The same problems, of course, beset the "cultural relativists," who maintain that all diverse cultural values are equally valid, and that no universal value judgments are possible. But that judgment is itself a universal judgment. It claims to be universally true that no judgments are universally true. It makes its own universal judgment and then simultaneously denies all others, because universal judgments are very, very bad.
It thus utterly ignores the crucial issue of how we go about making valid universal judgments in the first place. It exempts its own universal claims from any scrutiny by simply claiming they aren't claims.
The extreme cultural relativists thus maintain that "truth" is basically what any culture can come to agree on, and thus no "truth" is inherently better than any other. There was a certain vogue for this type of obscurantism during the sixties and seventies, but its profoundly self-contradictory nature became apparent with, to give the most notorious example, Michel Foucault's book The Order of Things. In this work Foucault maintained, in essence, that what humans come to call "truth" is simply an arbitrary play of power and convention, and he outlined several epochs where the "truth" seemed to depend entirely on shifting and conventional epistemes, or discursive formations governed not by "truth" but by exclusionary transformation principles. All truth, in other words, was ultimately arbitrary.
The argument seemed quite persuasive, and even caused a bit of an international sensation. Until his brighter critics simply asked him: "You say all truth is arbitrary. Is your presentation itself true?"
Foucault, like all relativists, had exempted himself from the very criteria he aggressively applied to others. He was making a series of truth claims that denied all truth claims (except his own privileged stance), and thus his position, as critics from Habermas to Taylor pointed out, was profoundly incoherent. Foucault himself abandoned the extreme relativism of this "archaeological" endeavor and subsumed it in a more balanced approach (that would include continuities as well as abrupt discontinuities; he called the merely archaeological approach "arrogant").
Nobody is denying that many aspects of culture are indeed different and equally valuable. The point is that that stance itself is universal and rejects theories that merely and arbitrarily rank cultures on an ethnocentric bias (which is fine). But because it claims that all ranking is either bad or arbitrary, it cannot explain its own stance and the process of its own (unacknowledged) ranking system. And if nothing else, unconscious ranking is bad ranking, by any other name.
And the relativists are very bad rankers. A theorist such as Michael Winkelman, vocal and vociferous in his condemnation of others for doing precisely what he himself does unconsciously, is just one of a long line of bad rankers, living only to denounce. Jürgen Habermas, as we will see in detail, has launched a devastating critique of these positions, pointing out that they all involve a "performative contradiction": another way of saying that they are implicitly presupposing universal validity claims that they deny can even exist.
In short, extreme cultural relativity and merely heterarchical value systems are about as dead as any movement can become. The word is out that qualitative distinctions are inescapable in the human condition, and further, that there are better and worse ways to make our qualitative distinctions.
In many ways, we want to agree with the broad conclusions of the cultural diversity movements: we do want to cherish all cultures in an equal light. But that universal pluralism is not a stance that all cultures agree with; that universal pluralism is a very special type of ranking that most ethnocentric and sociocentric cultures do not even acknowledge; that universal pluralism is the result of a very long history hard-fought against dominator hierarchies of one sort or another.
Why is universal pluralism better than dominator hierarchies? And how did we develop or evolve to a stance of universal pluralism, when most of history despised that view? These are some of the many developmental and evolutionary themes of this volume. How we arrive at that universal pluralism, and how we can defend it against those who would, in a dominating fashion, elevate their culture or their beliefs or their values above all others—these are the crucial questions whose answers are aborted by merely denying ranking and denying qualitative distinctions in the first place.
conclusion
But here is my point: if frameworks are inescapable (we are contexts within contexts, holons within holons), and if frameworks involve qualitative distinctions—in other words, if we are inextricably involved in judgments that are hierarchical—then we can begin to consciously join these judgments with the sciences of hierarchy, that is, the sciences of holarchy, of frameworks within frameworks, of contexts within contexts, of holons within holons—with the result that values and facts are no longer automatically divorced.
This unifying and integrative move was blocked as long as the heterarchists were calling their view "holistic" (when it was really "heapistic"). Blocked, because the heterarchists insisted that reality was nonhierarchical, whereas the sciences of wholeness insisted altogether otherwise. But with the understanding that the only way you get a holism is via a holarchy, we are now in a position to realign facts and values in a gentler embrace, with science working with us, not against us, in constructing a truly holistic, not heapistic, worldview.
Further, let us simply note that the Great Chain of Being was in fact a Great Holarchy of Being—with each link being an intrinsic whole that was simultaneously a part of a larger whole—and the entire series nested in Spirit.
If these various holarchies—in the sciences, in value judgments, in the great wisdom traditions—could in fact be sympathetically aligned with one another, a truly significant synthesis might indeed lie in our collective future.
Utrag från: http://www.amazon.com/Sex-Ecology-Spiri ... 1570627444
